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INTRODUCTION
Arbitration occupies an important place in the landscape of
dispute resolution options for commercial and financial disputes.
Over the past few decades, the number of traditional trials has
dropped, leading the academic community to discuss the
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phenomenon of the "vanishing trial"' and a concomitant "Quiet
Revolution"2  in the usage of alternative dispute resolution.
Arbitration is a well-established method for resolving disputes,
particularly within the business community. The conventional
wisdom is that arbitration offers a faster, less-expensive, more
private, flexible, and party-controlled means of resolving disputes,
with the further added advantage of being a less-adversarial process,
which helps to amicably preserve beneficial business relationships
between parties.3
However, recent surveys of arbitrators and counsel alike have
indicated that, despite this conventional wisdom, arbitration can play
out differently in practice.4  The adoption of arbitration in
business-to-business commercial disputes is not as widespread as
some in the legal community believe. Some surveys indicate that
some of the in-house and outside counsel collectively responsible for
litigating arbitrations are concerned that arbitration increasingly
resembles traditional litigation.5 As a result, some have argued that
the arbitration community needs to address these concerns in order to
ensure that arbitration remains a uniquely beneficial method of
dispute resolution and retains its comparative advantage over
litigation in terms of costs and duration.6  In short, large-scale
1. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and
Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459,
459 (2004) (tracing the decline in trials across various American fora).
2. See Thomas J. Stipanowich & J. Ryan Lamare, Living with ADR:
Evolving Perceptions and Use of Mediation, Arbitration, and Conflict
Management in Fortune 1000 Corporations, 19 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 2-3
(2014) (discussing the transformation of American conflict resolution at the end of
the twentieth century).
3. Id.
4. See discussion infra Part Il1(A) (revealing recent trends toward longer and
more costly arbitration).
5. Id.
6. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: "The "New Litigation," 2010 U.
ILL. L. REv. 1, 58-59 (2010) (concluding that arbitration's shift towards being a
"New Litigation" style of dispute resolution has "led to the frustration of many
users who find their arbitration experience wanting when measured in terms of its
conventional attributes such as speed and economy of process," and that therefore
there is a need to "understand and address arbitration in a more nuanced and
sophisticated way,... not as a unitary concept, but as a spectrum of possibilities
and a realm of choice that demands more active participation by those who use,
regulate, and comment on the arbitration processes").
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business-to-business arbitration has drifted, in some instances, closer
to litigation on the procedural end of the spectrum, and thus, it may
be necessary for arbitration to return to its roots.
Of the various concerns held by counsel involved in
arbitrations, many relate to the discovery phase of the arbitration
process. This Article will describe the ways in which different
arbitration regimes attempt to provide the appropriate level of
discovery necessary to resolve commercial disputes. It will also
compare discovery in arbitration to discovery in federal litigation in
order to provide a basis for determining the advantages or
disadvantages of arbitration. Further, this Article will describe the
various problems parties occasionally encounter while conducting
discovery in arbitration, and will show how such problems are
sometimes the result of parties seeking expansive discovery, and
arbitrators either shying away from using their discretion to limit
discovery, or believing that they lack the authority to prevent parties
from engaging in certain practices.
Part I of this Article outlines the revisions to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules). Part II describes the
arbitration rules promulgated by two different arbitration regimes,
and then compares them to the revisions of the Federal Rules.
Finally, Part III explains recent responses to concerns that arbitration
increasingly resembles litigation, and how changes to the Federal
Rules may have a spill-over effect on arbitration proceedings
through helping to limit discovery and allowing arbitrators to take
more of a managerial role during discovery.
I. THE 2015 REVISIONS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
Proposed amendments and revisions to the Federal Rules
have come out of committee, finished a period of public comment,
and gone into effect on December 1, 2015.7 These amendments aim
7. See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROC., REPORT TO STANDING
COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROC., app. B-1 to B-3 (2014) [hereinafter
SEPT. 2014 RULES REPORT], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Rules
AndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-2014-add.pdf (explaining the proposed
amendment and requesting consideration by the Supreme Court).
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to bring about a less costly, less protracted, and less burdensome
civil litigation process.8  A 2009 survey by the American Bar
Association's Section of Litigation concluded that there was a high
level of dissatisfaction with the current state of civil litigation in
federal courts.9  Judicial inattentiveness to discovery is often
lamented by practicing attorneys nationwide.'0  Additionally,
attorneys complain that the nature of discovery has fundamentally
8. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CWIL RULES & COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE
& PROC., REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE 2010
CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIGATION 4, 12 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 REPORT TO THE
CHIEF JUSTICE], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/
rules/Duke%20Materials/Library/Report%20to%20the%2Chief /o2OJustice.pdf
("[The goals of the amendments] are the goals of Rule 1: to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every civil action and proceeding in the federal
courts.").
9. See Paul W. Grimm & David S. Yellin, A Pragmatic Approach to
Discovery Reform: How Small Changes Can Make A Big Difference in Civil
Discovery, 64 S.C. L. REV. 495, 495-96 (2013) (mirroring a similar survey jointly
conducted by the American College of Trial Lawyers, and the Institute for the
Advancement of the American Legal system, which found that the civil justice
system was "in serious need of repair," and "takes too long and costs too much,"
while finding that practicing attorneys singled out discovery as "the primary cause
for cost and delay" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also A.B.A. SECTION
OF LITIGATION MEMBER SURVEY ON CIVIL PRACTICE: DETAILED REPORT, (2009)
5, 6, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Duke
%20Materials/Library/ABA%20Section%20of/o20Litigation,%2OSurvey%20on%
20Civil%20Practice.pdf ("Discovery. . . is seen as the primary cause for cost and
delay."); AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE
AM. LEGAL SYS., FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN
COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR
THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 2 (2009), available at
http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&template=/CM/ContentD
isplay.cfm&CContentl=4008 ("In short, the survey revealed widely-held opinions
that there are serious problems in the civil justice system generally ... From the
outside, the system is often perceived as cumbersome and inefficient.").
10. See Grimm & Yellin, supra note 11, at 505-06 (discussing the 2010
survey by the Federal Judicial Center, which found that two-thirds of respondents
agreed that judges do not invoke Rule 26 discovery limitations on their own, and
just under one half further agreed that judges "do not enforce Rule 26 to limit
discovery." (citing REBECCA M. HAMBURG & MATTHEW C. KOSKI, NAT'L. EMPT.
LAWYERS ASS'N, SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER SURVEY
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changed due to developments in the size and complexity of
litigation, the technological progress connected to the rise of
electronically stored information, and the legal culture pushing the
bounds of "broad" discovery over a period of more than seventy
years. 11
Over the past twenty years, the discovery phase of traditional
civil litigation has increased in duration and cost due to a number of
factors. First, the amount of potentially discoverable material has
increased, especially due to the tremendous growth in electronically
stored information.12 Second, parties are increasingly making broad
discovery requests, while their adversaries are making routine
objections, leading to more disputes.13  Finally, as the number of
trials has declined, discovery has sometimes become the forum for
"zealous" and "hyper-adversar[ial]" attorney behavior.14  The
Federal Rules aim at philosophically "broad"' discovery, but some
11. See Grimm & Yellin, supra note 11, at 507-08.
12. See David F. Herr & Jolynn M. Markinson, E-Discovery Under the
Minnesota Rules: Where We've Been, Where We Might Be Headed, 40 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 390, 406-07 (2014) (discussing "the continued application of
Moore's Law and the ever-decreasing cost of mass computer storage," and how
"[t]here are now exponentially more records involved in litigation than would once
have been possible.").
13. See Herr & Markison, supra note 14, at 407 ("It is easy to draft a
plausible-sounding document request that might call for production of a million
documents."); see also, Andrew Mast, Cost-Shifting in E-Discovery: Reexamining
Zubulake and 28 U.S.C. S 1920, 56 WAYNEL. REv. 1825, 1839 (2010) (discussing
how "the current scheme encourages excessively broad discovery requests");
Matthew L. Jarvey, Boilerplate Discovery Objections: How They Are Used, Why
They Are Wrong, and What We Can Do About Them, 61 DRAKE L. REv. 913, 914
(2013) ("One of the most rampant abuses of the discovery process is the use of
boilerplate objections to discovery requests.").
14. See Craig B. Shaffer & Ryan T. Shaffer, Looking Past the Debate:
Proposed Revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 7 FED. CTS. L. REV.
178, 189 (2013) ("As the number of cases going to trial continues to decline,
discovery becomes the context within which this 'zealous advocacy' plays out.");
see also, Brian Morris, The 2015 Proposals to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: Preparing for the Future of Discovery, 41 N. KY. L. REv. 133, 140
(2014) ("Litigants will be urged to curtail 'hyper-adversary behavior' while
encouraged to work directly with opposing counsel.").
15. See Grimm & Yellin, supra note 11, at 507-08.
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parties have used that leeway tactically to impose burden, delay, and
cost upon opposing parties. 16
In 2010, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules
(Advisory Committee) convened the "Duke Conference," which
included judges, representatives from big law firms, public interest
groups, and both plaintiff and defense counsel.17 The goal was to
produce guiding principles for a new package of rule changes to the
Federal Rules, meant to "refocus both the Federal Rules and
litigators on the mandate set forth in Rule 1 for the 'just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination' of federal civil litigation."' 8  The
conference determined that there was a need for "(1) early and active
judicial case management, (2) proportionality in discovery, and (3)
cooperation among lawyers. ' 9 In 2013, the Advisory Committee
decided to recommend the "Duke Rules Package," which included
suggested changes to the Rules themselves, for publication to the
Standing Committee.20  The suggested rule revisions encompassed
the three themes identified by the conference.2' In June of 2014,
after a period of further review, a finalized set of proposed
amendments was forwarded by the Advisory Committee for
consideration by the Judicial Conference, the Supreme Court, and
Congress.
22
16. The Duke Committee's 2010 REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE contrasts
how defense side parties perceive plaintiff parties with little information to be
discovered as "hav[ing] the ability to impose enormous expense on large data
producers-not only in legal fees but also in disruption of ongoing business-with
no responsibility . . . to reimburse the costs," with how plaintiff sides perceive
much of the cost of discovery to arise from defense "efforts to evade and
,stonewall' clear and legitimate requests," as well as filing motions "to impose
costs rather than to advance the litigation." 2010 REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE,
supra note 8, at 4.
17. See Morris, supra note 14, at 133-34 (describing the Duke conference,
and the individuals and entities whose attendance was "welcomed").
18. See id. at 134 (quoting 2010 REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 9
at 12) (discussing how abundant costs, burdens, and delays to litigation in federal
courts led to the Duke Conference).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 136-37.
21. See id. at 134 (discussing how the Duke themes "are the crux of the new
proposals that the Standing Committee approved for comment.").
22. See SEPT. 2014 RULES REPORT, supra note 7, at app. B-1 (stating that the
text of the proposed rules and the proposed Advisory Committee Notes
710 [Vol. 34:4
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A. Changes to Federal Rules 26 and 34
The most significant changes to the Federal Rules concern
Rules 26 and 34. Some commentators go so far as to argue that these
changes may affect the scope and nature of discovery, and constitute
a "sea change" in philosophically broad discovery.23 However,
given the suggested changes and the Advisory Committee's
comments, it remains to be seen whether the rules will cause such a
"sea change." Nevertheless, the various changes to these two rules
represent the Advisory Committee's attempt to strengthen
considerations of proportionality.
The Committee's recommendations made several changes to
Rule 26, with four key changes occurring in Rule 26(b)(1). First, the
recommendations elevate the "proportional[ity]" factors from Rule
26(b)(2)(C)(iii) to Rule 26(b)(1) in order to make them "part of the
scope of discovery.,2 4 Second, the recommendations eliminate the
language concerning the discovery of sources of information, finding
the language "unnecessary.,25 Third, the Committee eliminates the
language distinguishing between discovery of infornation "relevant
to the parties' claims or defenses," and discovery of information
"relevant to the subject matter of the action, on a showing of good
cause" by deleting the latter provision.26  Finally, the
recommendations remove the provision for discovery of information
"reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence."27 A memo released by the Advisory Committee indicates
the changes made with the new wording of the rule:
immediately following may be forward to the Judicial Conference, the Supreme
Court, and Congress).
23. See Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and
Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88
N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 331 (2013) (commenting that the substantive plausibility
requirement drastically effects a plaintiff's ability to survive the pleading stage).
24. SEPT. 2014 RULES REPORT, supra note 7, at app. B-4.
25. See id. ("[L]anguage regarding the discovery of sources of information is
removed as unnecessary[.]").
26. Id.
27. SEPT. 2014 RULES REPORT, supra note 7. at app. B-4.
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(b)(1) Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by
court order, the scope of discovery is as follows:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's
claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the
case, considering the importance of the issues at stake
in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties'
relative access to relevant information, the parties'
resources, the importance of the discovery in
resolving the issues, and whether the burden or
expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its
likely benefit. Information within this scope of
discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be
discoverable. inluding the existene, descr-iption-,
naturc, cuistody, condition, and location of--any
deecuments or other tangible things and the identity
and location of persons who know of any
discverable ma tc.. For geod caus t e ourt may
order dis.vr.y of any matter relvant to the subject
matter involved in the action. Relevant information
need not be admissible at the trial if the discovcry
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to the
limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(C+.2 1
The underlined language represents the addition of the new
proportionality threshold. Proportionality was previously found in
Rule 26 (b)(2)(C)(iii), but was not frequently employed by judges.29
However, the additional language attempts to make consideration of
proportionality part of the threshold analysis, by discussing the
"needs of the case, .... amount in controversy, .... parties' relative
access to relevant information," "parties' resources," "importance of
the issues at stake in the action," and whether the "burden or expense
of the proposed discovery" in fact "outweighs its likely benefit".30
28. SEPT. 2014 RULES REPORT, supra note 7. at app. B-30-31. The proposed
additions are underscored and the proposed deletions are struck-through.
29. See Morris, supra note 14, at 147 ("[T]he Advisory Committee noted that
judges and litigants rarely use the provision.").
30. SEPT. 2014 RULES REPORT, supra note 7, at app. B-30-31.
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This new text in Rule 26(b)(1), taken almost verbatim from the
current text of Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii),31 essentially casts
proportionality as a threshold requirement, one which lawyers and
judges will find harder to ignore.32
One new factor, however, has been added to (b)(2)(C)(iii)-a
requirement that courts must consider the parties' relative access to
information.33  This factor was included in part as an
31. In the revised rules, the language of 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) has been changed to
reflect the modification to 26(b)(1), so as to avoid redundancy. The new (C)(iii)
rule now reads:
(C) When Required. On motion or on its own, the court must limit the
frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed by these rules or by
local rule if it determines that: * * *
(iii) the burdefn or expense of the proposed discovery is outside the
scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1) outw.eighs its likely benefit,
conideingthe needs of the ease, the amounat in eontrov~ersy, the
patis' resouires, the importanee of the issues at stake in the aetion,
and he iportnce f the discovefy in resolving the issues.
SEPT. 2014 RULES REPORT, supra note 7, at app. B-32.
32. The questions of how to effectively provide for proportionality within
Rule 26 and where to do so has been debated for quite some time. The
proportionality factors-although not the term itself-were originally added by the
Committee in the 1983 revisions to Section (b)(1). However, in 1993, although
two new factors-whether "the burden or expense of the proposed discovery
outweighs its likely benefit," and "the importance of the proposed discovery in
resolving the issues"-were added, the Committee moved the proportionality
factors to Rule 26(b)(2)(C). SEPT. 2014 RULES REPORT, supra note 7, at app. B-5.
In the 2000 revisions however, the Committee again amended (b)(1), feeling the
need to add what it acknowledged to be an "otherwise redundant cross-reference"
directing that "(a]ll discovery is subject to the limitations imposed by
Rule26(b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii) [not Rule 26(b)(2)(C)]," because "courts were not
using the proportionality limitations as originally intended[.]" See generally id. at
app. B-7. In the current round of amendments, the Advisory Committee mentions
something which may explain this decades-long tension over how to encompass
proportionality; that during the Duke Conference, "discussions at the mini-
conference sponsored by the Subcommittee revealed significant discomfort with
simply adding the word 'proportional' to Rule 26(b)(1). Standing alone, the phrase
seemed too open-ended, too dependent on the eye of the beholder." As a result, the
committee for this newest round of amendments decided to include the word itself,
as well as the factors previously found in 26(b)(2)(C) in (b)(1). See SEPT. 2014
RULES REPORT, supra note 7, at app. B-5.
33. See id. at app. B-30.
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acknowledgement of the fact that some cases "involve what is often
called an information asymmetry" at the outset of litigation and
through the discovery phrase.34  The Advisory Committee
acknowledges that "[i]n practice these circumstances often mean that
the burden of responding to discovery lies heavier on the party who
has more information," but nevertheless this is cognizable under the
rules.35
In the Committee Note regarding the initial draft of the
proposed amendment o Rule 26, the Advisory Committee explained
that while consideration of proportionality was supposedly
"familiar," the purpose of this change is to incorporate
proportionality into the scope of discovery in a fashion "that must be
observed by the parties without court order,"36 thereby attempting to
ensure that the parties consider proportionality in every case, even
before a judge weighs in.37 Similarly, the narrowing of "relevan[ce]"
also furthers the goals of philosophically "proportional" discovery-
the Advisory Committee reasoned that if a matter is outside
"[p]roportional discovery relevant to any party's claim or defense,"
then "[s]uch discovery may support amendment of the pleadings to
add a new claim or defense that affects the scope of discovery."
38
The struck-through language appears to narrow the meaning
of "relevance" in the discovery context. The Federal Rules
previously permitted wide discovery, but the removal of the
"relevant to the subject matter" provision sends a message to judges
and counsel alike that discoverable material must comport with a
somewhat narrower definition of "relevance." Previously,
court-ordered discovery "[f]or good cause" would include items
"relevant to the subject matter involved in the action," and the
discovery of inadmissible but "reasonably calculated to lead to"
34. See SEPT. 2014 RULES REPORT, supra note 7. at app. B-40-41.
35. See id
36. See JUDGE DAVID G. CAMPBELL, COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE &
PROC., REPORT TO STANDING COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 22 (2013), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAnd
Policies/rules/Reports/CV05-2013.pdf [hereinafter "MAY 2013 RULES REPORT"].
37. See MAY 2013 RULES REPORT, supra note 36 at 22 ("[T]he change
incorporates them into the scope of discovery that must be observed by the parties
without court order.") (emphasis added).
38. MAY 2013 RULES REPORT, supra note 36 at 22.
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admissible evidence was permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).39  The
Advisory Committee states that the "relevant to the subject matter"
language was removed because, in their experience, it was "virtually
never used." 40  However, parties have sometimes relied upon the
"reasonably calculated" language to define the scope of discovery.4'
In those cases, such attempts contributed to the expensive,
time-consuming discovery practices, which sometimes rose to the
level of "fishing expeditions.42
According to the Advisory Committee, the revisions to Rule
26 seek to eliminate these practices, although it remains to be seen
whether, these changes will in fact bring about a meaningful change
in broad discovery in practice. The Advisory Committee contends
that these changes will not represent a meaningful change in the
scope of discovery, but this position may not reflect the practical
reality of how attorneys have historically invoked previous iterations
of the rules. Insofar as the Advisory Committee has determined that
existing rules have sometimes been misused, their pronouncement
that these revisions will not represent a major change rests on the
assumption that the previous rules, as practiced, were interpreted and
applied correctly.43 Decades of revisions to both proportionality and
relevance in Rule 26 indicates that the Advisory Committee has not
been satisfied with the practical interpretation and application of
39. See 2010 REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 8-9 (discussing
the scope of Rule 26(b)(i) in 2000).
40. See SEPT. 2014 RULES REPORT, supra note 7, at app. B-9, B-43 ("The
Committee has been informed that [the subject matter] language is rarely
invoked.").
41. See id. at app. B-9-10 (discussing the use of the "reasonably calculated"
language by attorneys to expand the scope of discovery to anything that is
reasonably calculated to be helpful in the litigation).
42. See Miller, supra note 23 at 353 ("Although that deletion appears
innocuous, the elimination of the passage was read by some-with some
justification-to negate any lingering notion that discovery was limitless and
permitted 'fishing' expeditions.").
43. See SEPT. 2014 RULES REPORT, supra note 7, at app. B-10 ("Most of the
comments opposing this change complained that it would eliminate a 'bedrock'
definition of the scope of discovery, reflecting the very misunderstanding the
amendment is designed to correct." (emphasis added)).
715
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either principle.44 Thus, it remains to be seen what the actual effect
of these revisions will be. If the changes to Rule 26 bring about the
Advisory Committee's apparently longstanding intentions
concerning proportionality and relevance, the changes may bring
about a substantial change in how discovery is actually practiced.
This is possible based on the Advisory Committee's repeated
pronouncements that parties' reading, interpretation, and usage of its
rules have often been incorrect.45
The changes to Rule 26 could potentially be abused by
parties with tactics such as vague proportionality objections, absent
corresponding revisions elsewhere. However, the Advisory
Committee makes such changes in Rule 34, by recommending two
additions to Section (b)(2). In Rule 34(b)(2)(B), parties objecting to
the production of items or categories of items must now explain the
44. See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text (describing the history of
proportionality revisions from 1983 to the present). In terms of the Advisory
Committee's longstanding attempts to provide for the proper scope of relevance,
the "reasonably calculated" language was first added in 1946, and initially
intended to cure the problem of parties using inadmissibility to bar relevant
discovery. After 1946, however, parties simply shifted to relying upon the new
language to define the scope of discovery, prompting a further attempt by the
Committee during the 2000 revisions to clarify their original intent, which the
Committee acknowledges also failed. See also SEPT. 2014 RULES REPORT, supra
note 7, at app. B-10 ("Despite the original intent of the sentence and the 2000
clarification, lawyers and courts continue to cite the 'reasonably calculated'
language as defining the scope of discovery. Some even disregard the reference to
admissibility, suggesting that any inquiry 'reasonably calculated' to lead to
something helpful in the litigation is fair game in discovery.").
45. Interpreting its own 2000 Committee Note which stated that "relevant
means within the scope of discovery as defined in this subdivision [(b)(1)][,]" the
2014 Committee states that "[t]hus, the 'reasonably calculated' phrase applie[d]
only to information that [was] otherwise within the scope of discovery set forth in
Rule 26(b)(1); it d[id] not broaden the scope of discovery." SEPT. 2014 RULES
REPORT, supra note 7, at app. B- 10 (emphasis added). However, that interpretation
of the Note was not always practiced. Rather, the scope of discovery continued to
be abused not only by lawyers, but by courts as well. See supra notes 32, 39-43
(discussing the misinterpretation of the proportionality limitations by courts).
Thus, the 2014 Advisory Committee's intent is that "[t]he proposed amendment
will eliminate this incorrect reading of Rule 26(b)(1) while preserving the rule that
inadmissibility is not a basis for opposing discovery of relevant information."
SEPT. 2014 RULES REPORT, supra note 7, at app. B-10 (emphasis added).
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basis for their objections "with specificity.' ,46  Under the revised
Rule 34(b)(2)(C), if such an objection is made, the objection must
further state whether any responsive materials are being withheld.47
The memo released by the Advisory Committee indicates how the
new rule will read:
[(b)(2)] Responses and Objections.
(A) Time to Respond. The party to whom the
request is directed must respond in writing within 30
days after being served or-if the request was
delivered under Rule 26(d)(2)-within 30 days after
the parties' first Rule 26(f) conference. A shorter or
longer time may be stipulated to under Rule 29 or be
ordered by the court.
(B) Responding to Each Item. For each item or
category, the response must either state that
inspection and related activities will be permitted as
requested or state an-objeetion with specificity the
grounds for objecting to the request, including the
reasons. The responding party may state that it will
produce copies of documents or of electronically
stored information instead of permitting inspection.
The production must then be completed no later than
the time for inspection specified in the request or
another reasonable time specified in the response.
(C) Objections. An objection must state whether
any responsive materials are being withheld on the
basis of that objection. An objection to part of a
request must specify the part and permit inspection of
the rest.
48
46. See SEPT. 2014 RULES REPORT, supra note 7, at app. B-53 ("Rule
34(b)(2)(B) is amended to require that objections to Rule 34 requests be stated
with specificity.").
47. See SEPT. 2014 RULES REPORT, supra note 7, at app. B-53 ("The
specificity of the objection ties to the new provision in Rule 34(b)(2)(C) directing
that an objection must state whether any responsive materials are being withheld
on the basis of that objection.").
48. SEPT. 2014 RULES REPORT, supra note 7, at app. B-51-53. The proposed
additions are underscored and the proposed deletions are struck-through.
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The first portion of underlined language in Section (B) and
the underlined language in Section (C) will serve to prevent parties
from responding to certain discovery demands with boilerplate, non-
specific objections.
The Advisory Committee explains that adding the
"specificity" requirement and the requirement to state what, if
anything, is being withheld are both collectively necessary to
eliminate the burdens imposed when the producing party-for
tactical reasons-makes everal vague, conclusory, or non-specific
objections, yet still produces some information.49 In such a situation,
the requesting party is burdened because they are uncertain whether
any relevant and responsive information has been withheld, and if so,
what information, and on what basis.5°
The revised Rule 34 also enumerates what the Advisory
Committee describes as the "common practice" of parties producing
copies of documents or electronically stored information instead of
allowing inspection.5' This revision has a corollary amendment,
found in Rule 37, which will be discussed further below.
52
B. The Duty of Cooperation: Federal Rules 1, 3 7, 26(f),
and 26(g)
The changes to the Federal Rules seek to ensure that parties
cooperate more than they have under the current rules in order to
resolve discovery disputes. In an attempt to increase cooperation
among parties, one of the changes to Rule 1 attempts to highlight the
parties' purported duty to cooperate.3 The Duke Conference
identified and sought to remedy the overall problem of parties
engaging in improper behavior during the discovery phase of
litigation. Thus, the Duke Conference attempted to ensure that all
entities-now including the parties themselves-involved in a
lawsuit must cooperate lest they violate the spirit of the rules. The
new rule reads: "Rule 1. Scope and Purpose. [These rules] should be
construed, and administered, and employed by the court and the
49. SEPT. 2014 RULEs REPORT, supra note 7, at app. B-11.
50. MAY2013 RULES REPORT, supra note 36, at 26-27.
51. SEPT. 2014 RULEs REPORT, supra note 7, at app. B-54.
52. See infra Part I(B).
53. Morris, supra note 14, at 140.
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parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action and proceeding.,54  With this change, the Advisory
Committee hopes to "emphasize that just as the court should
construe and administer these rules to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action, so the parties share the
responsibility to employ the rules in the same way."
55
It remains to be seen whether this revision will greatly affect
the manner in which discovery is conducted, given that the ideal of
cooperation and the duty to act in good faith is already contained in
the Federal Rules. Elsewhere in the rules, there are commands that
parties cooperate in order to prevent unnecessary cost, delay, and
judicial time that is spent resolving disputes. Federal Rule 37(a)(1)
already requires that parties certify in any motion to compel
disclosure or discovery that they have "in good faith conferred or
attempted to confer with the person or party failing to make
disclosure or discovery in an effort to obtain [disclosure or
discovery] without court action.,56  A revision to Rule
37(a)(3)(B)(iv), added to mirror the previously discussed addition to
Rule 34(b)(1) concerning inspection of documents, now provides
that a motion to compel a discovery response may be made if "a
party fails to produce documents or fails to respond that inspection
will be permitted.,
57
Another change to Rule 26(f)(2) makes parties "jointly
responsible" for "attempting in good faith to agree on the proposed
discovery plan," an outline of which must be submitted to the court
in writing within fourteen days after the Rule 16 scheduling
conference.58  The existing Rule 26(g)(1)(B), which requires
attorneys' signatures on discovery requests, responses, and
objections, forbids parties' attorneys from engaging in dilatory or
disingenuous discovery activities.59 Rule 26(g)(1)(B)(i) requires that
requests, responses, and objections be consistent with the rules, laws,
54. MAY 2013 RULES REPORT, supra note 36, at 17 (presenting the Duke
Rules Package to the standing committee).
55. Id. (describing the purpose of the amendments to Rule 1).
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1).
57. See SEPT. 2014 RULES REPORT, supra note 7, at app. B-55 (underlined
text is newly added to existing rule).
58. FED. R. Cwv. P. 26(f)(2).
59. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1)(B).
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or some other "nonfrivolous argument" for modifying the existing
law.6 °  Rule 26(g)(1)(B)(ii) requires that parties not interpose
requests, responses, or objections for "improper purpose[s]," such as
harassment, delay, or needless increase of cost.6 1 Lastly, the existing
version of Rule 26(g)(1)(B)(iii) explicitly requires that parties
consider proportionality.
62
Cooperative duties, similar to those found in Rule 37 and
envisioned by the revised Rule 1, are sometimes also apparent in
local rules of specific courts. The District Courts for the Southern
and Eastern Districts of New York make provisions for efficient and
cooperative resolution of discovery disputes, although these
provisions vary slightly. The Eastern District requires parties to
attempt to resolve disputes before the court will hear discovery
motions, while the Southern District requires the parties to attempt to
resolve any disputes before seeking assistance from the court.63 The
District Court of Maryland also features a local rule requiring
conference between counsel before the court will consider any
motion.
64
60. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1)(B)(i).
61. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1)(B)(ii).
62. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1)(B) ("[Attorneys must acknowledge
discovery is] neither unreasonable nor unduly burdensome or expensive,
considering the needs of the case, prior discovery in the case, the amount in
controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the action.").
63. Compare S.D.N.Y. & E.D.N.Y. LOCAL Civ. R. 37.3, 38, available at
http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/rules/rules.pdf ("Prior to seeking judicial resolution
of a discovery or non-dispositive pretrial dispute, the attorneys for the affected
parties or non-party witness shall attempt to confer in good faith in person or by
telephone in an effort to resolve the dispute, in conformity with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 37(a)(1).") with S.D. & E.D.N.Y. LOCAL Civ. R. 37.2, 37,
available at http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/rules/rules.pdf ("No motion under
Rules 26 through 37 inclusive of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shall be
heard unless counsel for the moving party has first requested an informal
conference with the Court by letter-motion for a pre-motion discovery conference.
. . and such request has either been denied or the discovery dispute has not been
resolved as a consequence of such a conference.").
64. See D. MD. LOCAL R. 104.7, 12 (Supp. 2012), available at
http://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/localrules/LocalRules-Oct2O12Supplement.pdf
("Counsel shall confer with one another concerning a discovery dispute and make
sincere attempts to resolve the differences between them. The Court will not
consider any discovery motion unless the moving party has filed a certificate
reciting (a) the date, time and place of the discovery conference, and the names of
all persons participating therein, or (b) counsel's attempts to hold such a
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C. Increased Involvement of the Judge: Rules 4 and 16
The Duke Conference also concluded that "sustained, active,
hands-on judicial case management" was essential to improving the
disposition of civil actions under the Federal Rules.65 As a result, the
revisions to Rules 4 and 16 intend to ensure that judges become more
involved, and involved earlier.
66
The Committee also made various changes to Rule 16,
deleting the provision that allowed the initial case management
conference to be held "by telephone, mail, or other means," in order
to foster a more direct, in-person series of exchanges between
parties.6 7  However, the Committee Note to the revised rule
nevertheless provides that "[t]he conference may be held [...] by
telephone, or by more sophisticated electronic means," so long as it
remains consistent with the Committee's view that "[a] scheduling
conference is more effective if the court and parties engage in direct
simultaneous communication."68  As such, it appears that a live
video teleconference would still be permissible, especially if other
alternatives would be unnecessarily burdensome.
Additionally, the rule reduces the timeframe for holding the
conference. Under the rule, the conference must occur within the
earlier of 90 days after any defendant has been served, or 60 days
after any defendant has appeared; while the current rule provides that
the conference must occur within the earlier of 120 days and 90
days, respectively.69  The revisions to Rule 4 also reduce the
conference without success; and (c) an itemization of the issues requiring
resolution by the Court.").
65. SEPT. 2014 RULES REPORT, supra note 7, at app. B-2-3 (noting that after
a year of reviewing several forms of data, there was near-unanimous agreement
that the disposition of civil actions could be improved by early judicial case
management).
66. See SEPT. 2014 RULES REPORT, supra note 7, at app. B-12 (discussing
how the Committee recommended to reduce the time limit for serving the
summons from twelve days to eight days).
67. See SEPT. 2014 RULES REPORT, supra note 7, at app. B-25, B-27 ("A
scheduling conference is more effective if the court and parties engage in direct
simultaneous communication.").
68. SEPT. 2014 RULES REPORT, supra note 7, at app. B-27 (quoting the
Committee Note).
69. Id. at B-25-26.
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timeframe for serving summons and complaints from 120 days to 90
days.7 °
Finally, the revised Rule 16(b)(3)(B) provision discussing
what the judge's scheduling order may include has a new addition
that also speaks to heightened judicial case management. The new
Rule 16(b)(3)(B)(v) provides that the scheduling order may "direct
that before moving for an order relating to discovery, the movant
must request a conference with the court."71 Thus, the revised rules
envision an earlier and more active engagement of judges in
discovery.
D. Withdrawn Changes: Discovery Mechanisms and
Scheduling Timeframes
Certain proposed changes were withdrawn from the final
draft of the rules after the comment period, in the face of strong
opposition. These changes sought to dramatically limit the time and
cost of discovery, and likely would have done so if adopted. Rule 30
currently governs the presumptive number of depositions and
presently provides each party the opportunity to conduct ten
depositions, with seven hours per deposition, whereas the rejected
revision permitted each party to conduct five depositions, with six
hours per deposition.72 Rule 33 governs the permissible number of
interrogatories, and presently provides for up to twenty-five per party
whereas the rejected revision provided for fifteen interrogatories per
party.73 Rule 36 governs requests to admit, and currently has no
standing numerical limit whereas the rejected revision had a
presumptive limit of twenty-five requests to admit per party.74
70. SEPT. 2014 RULES REPORT, supra note 7. at app. B-23.
71. Id. at B-27.
72. See MAY 2013 RULES REPORT, supra note 36, at 24 (discussing the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules Report to the Standing Committee for Rule
30).
73. See MAY 2013 RULES REPORT, supra note 36, at 25 ("The purpose [of the
reduction in the presumptive number of interrogatories] . . . is to encourage the
parties to think carefully about the most efficient and least burdensome use of
discovery devices.").
74. See id. at 27; see also Schaffer & Schaffer, supra note 14, at 198-99
("Under the proposed revision, a party could serve on any other party twenty-five
requests to admit, but the numerical limit would exempt requests to admit the
authenticity of documents.").
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Under the original proposed new rules, parties seeking
discovery above and beyond the new permissible amounts would
have had to seek leave from the judge. To the degree that judges-in
light of the other rule changes-might have been hesitant to grant
such extensions, these changes would likely have saved time and
money in many cases, if adopted.75 However, even if these proposed
rules had been adopted, parties would still have been free to stipulate
to more depositions for various reasons uch as when "the need for
more depositions is obvious where both parties require more
depositions for expert witnesses or when the case involves complex
litigation.76
E. Analysis
It is difficult at this stage to predict how the rule changes will
affect discovery. It appears they will likely result in somewhat fewer
discovery disputes and an overall decrease in the cost and length of
discovery; however, the limited nature of the changes suggests hat
the impact may actually not be dramatic. The "Duty of Cooperation"
change to Rule 1, for example, which does not even explicitly use
the word "cooperation," although its purported purpose was to create
a meaningful duty to do so, may be insufficient to achieve its
purpose. As noted above, the duty to cooperate already exists in the
current version of the Federal Rules but has proven ineffective at
preventing detrimental behavior of counsel. Moreover, what
constitutes a breach of the revised "duty" under the revised rule is
unclear and leaves it to judges to determine whether or not a breach
75. See Morris, supra note 14, at 156 ("Requesting more depositions or
discovery devices when leave from the court is required, however, is more
difficult. Such a request would be subject to the new proportionality requirement
that balances cost, burden, benefit, previous opportunity to obtain the requested
information, and whether the request is duplicative or cumulative.").
76. Id.; see also, Advisory Comm. on Rules of Civil Procedure, Draft Agenda
Book of the April 11-12, 2013 Meeting of the Advisory Committee on the Rules of
Civil Procedure, 95 (2013)), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Civil/CV2013-04.pdf (describing how
the changes to Rule 30 would have continued to direct the court that it "must"
grant leave to take more depositions to the extent consistent with Rule 26(b)(1)
and (2), and that "Rule 30(a)(2)(A) continues to recognize that the parties may
stipulate to a greater number").
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has occurred, and whether sanctions would be an appropriate
remedy.77
Beyond the obvious problems of uniformity and consistency,
at present, imposing sanctions upon attorneys for clear misbehavior
is currently a relatively limited occurrence due to what appears to be
a fairly high standard; the available examples suggest that the rules
would need to provide a more explicit command for judges to
impose sanctions more often to be successful.78 As the current Rules
26, 34, and 37 stand, commentators have argued that although
sanctions are clearly appropriate in some situations-such as
boilerplate objections or refusals to respond to discovery requests-
the rules are "much less helpful when it comes to regulating subtle
discovery abuses," and because of the "good cause" standard of Rule
26(b)(1), "courts tend to let the vast majority of discovery requests
pass without in-depth review. ' 79  Even the previously discussed
District of Maryland, whose courts have "'stressed the importance of
cooperation during discovery' and have indicated the
77. See Grimm & Yellin, supra note 11, at 506 (discussing how there are
"common complaints" that sanctions for failure to follow the discovery rules are
"seldom imposed," based on a "reluctance to impose sanctions for discovery
violations" by the courts).
78. In the context of "spoliation" discovery sanctions, the Advisory
Committee indicates that the desire to maintain a uniform standard has led the
rules to require "'reasonable steps,' which can be seen as a form of culpability."
See Judicial Conference of the U.S., Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Rules
of Civil Procedure 23 (April 10-11, 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/15093/
download (stating that "the revised proposal ... is limited to circumstances in
which a party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve .... thus embracing a
form of 'culpability'). In practice, Judges have long been reluctant to sanction
even conduct which crossed the line of objective "bad faith," although there is
evidence that they pay attention to such a showing as an important part of the
calculus. Compare Day v. Allstate Ins. Co., 788 F.2d 1110, 1113 (5th Cir. 1986)
(dismissing a claim where failure to cooperate amounted to "willful, in bad faith,
and 'in callous disregard for the obligations of [the other] party.."') with Eby v.
Target Corp., No. 13-10688, 2014 WL 941906, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 11, 2014)
(refusing to sanction for failure to preserve "without a showing of culpability").
The rarity of judges sanctioning attorney conduct has, finally, given rise to some
anecdotes based on cases where judges have actually done so. See Morris, supra
note 14, at 141 n.82 (citing a 2011 "Above the Law" article describing how a
judge once ordered attorneys to a "kindergarten party" because they failed to be
reasonable and civil to one another).
79. Mitchell London, Resolving the Civil Litigant's Discovery Dilemma, 26
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 837, 853 (2013).
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appropriateness of sanctions such as precluding a party's experts
from testifying at trial and granting summary judgment to 'deter
severely abusive litigation practices,"'80 seems to "require a higher
threshold-of subjective bad faith or lack of substantial
justification-to sanction attorneys for discovery misconduct under
the Rules."8'
Some commentators have also raised the question of a
potential burden shift concerning which party must first demonstrate
proportionality. Previously, the burden was "on the producing party
to make a 'particular and specific demonstration of fact' supporting
any contention that discovery [requests were] disproportionate. The
party seeking a protective order 'ha[d] the burden of demonstrating
good cause' and must [have] offer[ed] specific support for its motion
beyond mere conclusory statements.82 The revisions to Rules 26
and 34 arguably could reverse these roles. At least one state has
already enacted discovery reforms which mirror the federal changes,
and this state construed its own rules to mean that the "'party seeking
discovery always has the burden of showing proportionality and
relevance."'
83
There is at least some basis to argue that such a reversal
could happen as a result of the 2015 revisions. In Oppenheimer
Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, the Supreme Court explained that a district
court judge could, under certain circumstances, require the
requesting party to pay for discovery costs, stating:
Under [the discovery rules], the presumption is that
the responding party must bear the expense of
complying with discovery requests, but he may
80. Paul W. Grimm, Ilan Weinberger & Lisa Yurwit, New Paradigm for
Discovery Practice: Cooperation, MD. B.J., Nov.-Dec. 2010, at 26, 30 (quoting
PAUL W. GRIMM, CHARLES FAX & PAUL MARK SANDLER, MARYLAND DISCOVERY
PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 245 (2008)).
81. See id (noting a difference in thresholds on discovery abuse sanctions,
even though the Maryland and Federal rules "yield parallel sanctions").
82. Morris, supra note 14, at 148 n.150 (citing Cartel Asset Mgmt. v. Ocwen
Fin. Corp., No. 01-CV-01644-REB-CBS, 2010 WL 502721, at *10 (D. Colo. Feb.
8, 2010); Aikens v. Deluxe Fin. Servs., Inc., 217 F.R.D. 533, 534 (D. Kan. Aug. 5,
2003)) (footnote omitted).
83. Morris, supra note 14, at 147 (quoting UTAH R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l)-(3)).
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invoke the district court's discretion under Rule 26(c)
to grant orders protecting him from "undue burden or
expense" in doing so, including orders conditioning
discovery on the requesting party's payment of the
costs of discovery.
84
Looking at this text anew and integrating the revised versions
of Rules 26(b) and 34, the discretionary protection (for which the
producing party must currently attempt to argue) becomes
significantly less discretionary if it is possible to argue the requesting
party sought disproportionate discovery in the first place. Under the
revised rules, it appears that a party moving for protection under
Rule 26(c) could argue that the requesting party failed to meet the
proportionality requirement now explicitly stated in Rule 26(b)(2),
rather than the previous, weaker requirement which was buried in a
later part of Section (b), and therefore often ignored by judges.
These factors could result in a de facto burden reversal: a judge who
consistently applies the revised Rule 26(b)(1) as a matter of course
might not allow discovery if the requesting party cannot, at the time
it makes a discovery request, explain why its request is
"proportional."
The current Supreme Court arguably might endorse such a
reading and hold that, under a revised rule, the burden to show
proportionality is on the party seeking discovery. The argument for
this is based upon the Court's various civil procedure decisions since
2007. In a recent article, Arthur Miller argues that compared to the
1938 language, the 2000 changes to Rule 26 "sen[t] a signal... with
rather Delphic qualities" with regard to the question of burden.
85
Shifting to the pending changes as they appeared in 2013, Miller
then highlights the conceptual similarity of placing the burden to
show proportionality on the party seeking discovery with placing
what Miller sees as a quasi-factual burden upon the plaintiff during
the pleadings before discovery occurs.
86
According to Miller, in the pleadings stage of litigation,
Twombly and Iqbal effectively, but impermissibly, re-wrote Rule 8
84. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978).
85. Miller, supra note 23, at 355.
86. See Miller, supra note 23, (discussing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)).
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in a way that forces plaintiffs to "protectively negate potential
87defenses" at the pleadings stage. Miller added that to do so created
"too much potential for inappropriate merit determinations-based
only on the complaint-in the Jqbal regime."88 This type of doctrine
was "inappropriate," because, in Miller's view, because questions of
the "plausibility" of "facts" under Twombly and Iqbal can potentially
make motions to dismiss "morph into a trial-type inquiry" before
discovery has actually occurred.89 There is an obvious, inherent
"information asymmetry" at the outset of most litigation, which
Twombly and Iqbal can fairly be said to have protected in favor of
the original vital information holder at the pleadings stage. By doing
this, Twombly and Jqbal made cases less likely to proceed, and
therefore less likely to be resolved on the merits.90
The Twombly and Jqbal holdings favored certain institutional
entities depending on the case because information which is legally
necessary for plaintiffs to have to survive pleadings, is typically
"entirely in the defendant's possession and unavailable to the
plaintiff."91 This mirrors discovery concerns if-as it appears might
happen under the new rules--discovery is revised to require
plaintiffs to speak intelligently about proportionality before they
know what information is potentially discoverable. As a result,
Miller argues for a conceptual link between what occurred in
Twombly and Iqbal and what might happen as a result of the
amendments pertaining to discovery. However, Miller reasons that
87. Miller, supra note 23, at 355.
88. Id. at 333-34, 335-36.
89. See id. at 338-39 ("What seems to have been overlooked in the current
rush to judgment is that sometimes what appears implausible on the face of a
complaint proves quite plausible when illuminated by discovery."); see also Alan
B. Morrison, The Necessity of Tradeoffs in a Properly Functioning Civil
Procedure System, 90 OR. L. REV. 993, 1016-17 (2012) ("Because the requesting
party did not know what would be produced, it was impossible to know in advance
whether it would produce relevant information.").
90. See Miller, supra note 23, at 340-41 ("Twombly and Iqbal have shifted
this information-access balance so that it favors those defendants best able to keep
their records, conduct, and institutional secrets to themselves.").
91. See id (noting that "[i]n many contemporary litigation contexts," the
information needed is complex and unavailable to the plaintiff, and that it is "futile
and a bit absurd to tell someone to plead what he or she does not know and cannot
access").
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"judicial 'common sense' suggests that, when a plaintiff has no
economically or logistically reasonable way of unearthing important
information that is in the possession of the defendant, the plausibility
barrier needs to be lowered somewhat to allow some contained
discovery."
92
By similar logic, that same outcome arguably might result
from the revised discovery rule. Twombly and Iqbal "offered three
propositions to justify the changes they were making in the pleading
regime: (1) the threat of abusive litigation behavior and frivolous
lawsuits is present; (2) the possibility of extortionate settlements
against businesses must be avoided; and (3) litigation is
expensive."93  These concerns effectively mirror some of the
concerns that caused the push for discovery reform. Some of the
discovery practices that led to the revised rules would also fall well
within the ambit of "abusive litigation behavior.",94  In addition,
some commentators and the participants at the Duke Conference
explicitly noted broad discovery has driven up the price of
litigation.95 Given these clear similarities, there is a good basis upon
which to argue that if the revised Rule 26 is adopted, the Court could
find that the burden to satisfy strengthening proportionality and
narrowing "relevance" requirements will indeed fall upon the party
seeking the discovery, for reasons similar to those which contributed
to the outcomes seen in Twombly and Iqbal.
The Advisory Committee was aware of these (and similar)
arguments, and attempted to establish a clear position that such
burden reversals would not result from the revised rules. The
Committee acknowledged arguments that the new proportionality
calculus would favor defendants, become a new "blanket objection"
to all discovery requests, "impose[s] a new burden on the requesting
party to justify each and every discovery request," or that cost
shifting-consistent with Oppenheimer, which the Committee
92. Morrison, supra note 89, at 341 (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 360.
94. See Miller, supra note 23, at 361 (linking "abusive litigation behavior" to
some cases of "motions and discovery requests and objections that should not have
been made.").
95. See 2010 REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 7 (noting that
the Conference discussions included the "costs, delays, and abuses imposed by
overbroad discovery demands").
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specifically mentioned-would become a common practice." As a
result, the Committee Note explains:
Restoring the proportionality calculation to
Rule 26(b)(1) does not change the existing
responsibilities of the court and the parties to consider
proportionality, and the change does not place on the
party seeking discovery the burden of addressing all
proportionality considerations.
Nor is the change intended to permit the
opposing party to refuse discovery simply by making
a boilerplate objection that it is not proportional.97
Later on in the same note, the Committee also emphasized
that as far as cost-shifting is concerned, "[r]ecognizing the authority
does not imply that cost-shifting should become a common practice.
Courts and parties should continue to assume that a responding party
ordinarily bears the cost of responding."
98
II. DIFFERENT ARBITRATION REGIMES AND CHALLENGES POSED
BY PARTY CHOICE
Attempting to generally describe rules that govern discovery
in arbitrations would be akin to attempting to generally describe a set
of rules which apply to all types of professional sports. First, there
are many different contexts in which arbitrations occur:
international, domestic, securities, consumer, small claims, and
court-annexed programs, to name a few. Second, various
organizations administer arbitrations, and each has its own sets of
rules. Third, the nature of arbitration-a party-driven dispute
resolution mechanism--does not lend itself to establishing a set of
rules that will apply in all contexts. Thus, it is beyond the scope of
this Article-or perhaps any article--to examine the rules and
regimes for all arbitrations because in the context of arbitration, a
96. SEPT. 2014 RULES REPORT, supra note 7, at app. B-5, B- 11.
97. SEPT. 2014 RULES REPORT, supra note 7, at app. B-39.
98. Id. at B-45.
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one-size-fits-all approach to arbitration does not exist and, for
reasons discussed below, would be impracticable.
This Part focuses on the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation
Services' (JAMS)99 and the American Arbitration Association's
(AAA) rules used for commercial arbitrations to describe the
regimes used to decide many domestic commercial disputes, before
finally comparing these rules to the revisions to the Federal Rules.1 °,
A. JAMS
Founded in 1979, JAMS is the "largest private alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) provider in the world," and employs
almost 300 full-time neutrals, including retired judges and
attorneys.10 1  JAMS arbitration and mediation services provide
various sets of rules and procedures, including the comprehensive
and streamlined rules and procedures to govern arbitrations.102
The Comprehensive Arbitration Rules and Procedures
(Comprehensive Rules) govern binding arbitrations administered by
JAMS unless the parties provide for other rules in their arbitration
agreements.0 3 Under the Comprehensive Rules, discovery is largely
controlled by Rule 17, which is titled: "Exchange of Information."'
0 4
Rule 17 states that parties "shall cooperate in good faith in the
voluntary and informal exchange of all non-privileged documents
and other information (including electronically stored information
('ESI')) relevant to the dispute or claim immediately after
99. JAMS was formerly known as Judicial Arbitration and Mediation
Services.
100. Although arbitration is used extensively to resolve international
disputes, it is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss international arbitration.
Thus, this Article focuses on domestic commercial arbitration.
101. About JAMS, JAMS ARB., MEDIATION, & ADR SERVICES, http://
www.jamsadr.com/aboutusoverview/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2015).
102. ADR Clauses, Rules, and Procedures, JAMS ARB., MEDIATION, &
ADR SERVICES, http://www.jamsadr.com/rules-clauses/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2015
(referring to specific rule bodies, the "Comprehensive" and "Streamlined" rules.
JAMS also features "Class Action," "Construction," and "Employment" arbitration
rules, which are not discussed in this Article).
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commencement of the Arbitration." °5 The Rule also provides that
"[e]ach Party may take one deposition of an opposing Party or of one
individual under the control of the opposing Party," and that "[t]he
necessity of additional depositions shall be determined by the
Arbitrator based upon the reasonable need for the requested
information, the availability of other discovery options[,] and the
burdensomeness of the request on the opposing Parties and the
witness."
'1 06
Under the "Streamlined Rules,"'0 7 exchange of information is
governed by Rule 13.'08 Rule 13 initially provides the same
language as Rule 17, and states that parties "shall cooperate in good
faith in the voluntary and informal exchange of all non-privileged
documents and information (including electronically stored
information ('ESI')) relevant to the dispute or claim"; 10 9 thereafter,
these two rules differ. Under Rule 13, parties must provide:
copies of all documents in their possession or control
on which they rely in support of their positions or that
they intend to introduce as exhibits at the Arbitration
Hearing, the names of all individuals with knowledge
about the dispute or claim[,] and the names of all
experts who may be called upon to testify or whose
reports may be introduced at the Arbitration
Hearing.
110
105. JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARB. R. 17 (2014), available at http://
www.jamsadr.com/rules-comprehensive-arbitration/ (internal quotation marks
omitted).
106. Id.
107. The streamlined rules "govern binding Arbitrations of disputes or
claims that are administered by JAMS and in which the Parties agree to use these
Rules or, in the absence of such agreement, no disputed claim or counterclaim
exceeds $250,000, not including interest or attorneys' fees, unless other Rules are
prescribed." JAMS STREAMLINED ARB. R. 1 (2014), available at http://
www. jamsadr.com/rules-streamlined-arbitration/.
108. JAMS STREAMLINED ARB. R. 13. (2014), available at http://
www. jamsadr.com/rules-streamlined-arbitration/.
109. JAMS STREAMLINED ARB. R. 13 (2014), available at http://
www. j amsadr.com/rules-streamlined-arbitration/.
110. Id.
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This Rule states that the parties and the arbitrator must make every
effort to conclude the document and information exchange process
within fourteen calendar days after all pleadings and notice of claims
have been received, and that the necessity of any additional
information "shall be determined by the Arbitrator based upon the
reasonable need for the requested information, the availability of
other discovery options[,] and the burdensomeness of the request on
the opposing Parties and the witness."'" 1 There is no provision in the
Streamlined Rules that explicitly provides for depositions.
JAMS allows, through mutual agreement by both parties, the
use of two rules providing for "Expedited Procedures," which are
found in Rules 16.1 and 16.2 of the Comprehensive Rules.1 2 JAMS
has included these two rules within the Comprehensive rules ince
2010."l3 Pursuant to Rule 16.1, these two Expedited Procedures take
effect if they "are referenced in the Parties' agreement o arbitrate or
are later agreed to by all Parties."' 14 Rule 16.2 narrows discovery in
terms of both timeframe and subject matter." 15 Under the Expedited
Procedures, the arbitrator "shall require" parties to "confirm in
writing" that they have complied with the Rule 16.2(a) duty to
cooperate in a good-faith, voluntary exchange of documents and
information, and parties must do so prior to the arbitrator conducting
the preliminary conference."
6
JAMS Rule 16.2 limits document requests to documents
"directly relevant to the matters in dispute or to its outcome," which
are "reasonably restricted in terms of time frame, subject matter[,]
and persons or entities to which the requests pertain," and prohibits
111. JAMS STREAMLINED ARB. R. 13 (2014).
112. JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARB. R. 16.1-2 (2010), available at http://
www.j amsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMSComprehensive
_ArbitrationRules-20 10.pdf..
113. Meredith N. Reinhardt, JAMS Issues New Optional Expedited
Arbitration Procedures, IN-HOUSE LITIGATOR, Winter 2011, at 1, 1.
114. JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARB. R. 16.1 (2014), available at http://
www.j amsadr.com/rules-comprehensive-arbitration/.
115. JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARB. R. 16.2 (2014), available at http://
www.jamsadr.com/rules-comprehensive-arbitration/ (limiting document requests
to documents "directly relevant to the matters in dispute or to its outcome," and
requiring that they be "reasonably restricted in terms of time frame, subject matter,
and persons or entities to which they pertain," and prohibiting the use of "broad
phraseology," or extensive "definitions" or "instructions").
116. Id.
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the use of "broad phraseology."' 1 7 The rules limit e-discovery and
include a proportionality requirement relating to e-discovery.
118
Finally, although the expedited rules do not eliminate the single
deposition provided by Rule 17(b) provides-the language of Rule
16.2(d)(i) contains strong language directing the arbitrator to limit
depositions-these xpedited rules direct the arbitrator to examine
the amount in controversy, the complexity of the factual issues, the
number of parties, the diversity of parties' interests, and whether any
of the claims may have merit to justify the time and expense of the
requested discovery. 1
9
The two Expedited Rules are optional, and are invoked at the
will of all parties.120 In situations where the parties do not invoke the
Expedited Rules, however, the normal Rule 16 states that at the
request of any party, or at the direction of the arbitrator, a
preliminary conference will be conducted.'2' This conference may
address matters uch as the exchange of information pursuant to Rule
17, the discovery schedule "as permitted by the Rules, as agreed by
the Parties or as required or authorized by applicable law,"
pleadings, any agreement to clarify or narrow the issues at stake in
the arbitration, scheduling of the hearing, potential dispositive
motions, attendance of witnesses, and various other matters which
parties or arbitrators uggest.'22 However, parties are not required to
confirm prior compliance in writing before the preliminary
conference occurs, as they would be under the Expedited rules.1
23
By confirming compliance in writing under the Expedited Rules,
parties enter the preliminary conference essentially having stated that
they have either completed discovery, or having identified "any
117. JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARB. R. 16.2 (2014).
118. See id. ("Where the costs and burdens of e-discovery are
disproportionate to the nature of. . . the materials requested, the Arbitrator may
either deny such requests or order disclosure on the condition that the requesting
Party advance the reasonable cost of production to the other side, subject to the
allocation of costs in the final award.").
119. Id. at 16.2(d)(i).
120. JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARB. R. 16.1 (2014), available at http://
www.jamsadr.com/rules-comprehensive-arbitration/.
121. JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARB. R. 16 (2014), available at http://
www.jamsadr.com/rules-comprehensive-arbitration/.
122. Id.
123. See JAMS COMPREHENSIVEARB. R. 16.2 (2014).
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limitations on full compliance and the reasons therefor," ensuring
immediate attention to those issues.124 In contrast, under the normal
Rule 16, it is possible that parties are still in the process of
exchanging information and discovery disputes may subsequently
arise.
B. The American Arbitration Association
The American Arbitration Association (AAA) functions
similarly to JAMS, in that it provides both arbitration services, as
well as various bodies of rules for parties that opt to arbitrate their
disputes. The AAA's "Commercial" rules include "Expedited
Procedures," by which-similar to the JAMS Rules 16.1 and 16.2-
parties may opt to be governed.
125
The AAA discovery rule, R-22, governs "Pre-Hearing
Exchange and Production of Information" and provides that "[tihe
arbitrator shall manage any necessary exchange of information
among the parties with a view to achieving an efficient and
economical resolution of the dispute, while at the same time
promoting equality of treatment and safeguarding each party's
opportunity to fairly present its claims and defenses.'26 This rule
further provides that "[t]he arbitrator may, on application of a party
or on the arbitrator's own initiative" require parties to exchange
documents, update their exchanges, exchange non-disclosed
documents, or produce documents in a particular form.
127
Comparing the AAA rules to JAMS, the AAA R-22 adopts
an arbitrator-defined conception of relevance while suggesting that
the arbitrator consider proportionality, by directing the arbitrator to
maintain an overall "view to achieving an efficient and economical
resolution of the dispute.' 28 In contrast, JAMS Rule 17 adopts a
more objectively defined conception of relevance by outlining the
meaning of the term itself; the JAMS rule requires that discovered
124. JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARB. R. 16.2 (2014).
125. AAA COMMERCIAL ARB. R. & MEDIATION P. R-1 (2013), available at
https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeld=/UCMADRSTG_004103
("Parties may, by agreement, apply the Expedited Procedures...").
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material be "relevant to the dispute or claim," and that the material
be something "on which [the parties] rely in support of their
positions" language.129 The AAA rule states that an arbitrator must
"[safeguard] each party's opportunity to fairly present its claims and
defenses," but it does not contextualize the "claims and defenses"
language further, and does not directly use the word "relevance."
'1 30
The AAA's R-33 permits dispositive motions at the
arbitrator's discretion "only if the arbitrator determines that the
moving party has shown that the motion is likely to succeed and
dispose[s] of or narrow[s] the issues in the case."'13 1 The AAA Rules
do not explicitly prohibit depositions, but the rule only mentions
depositions in the rules governing "Large, Complex Commercial
Disputes."'1 32  Under Rule L-3, "In exceptional cases, at the
discretion of the arbitrator, upon good cause shown and consistent
with the expedited nature of the arbitration, the arbitrator may order
depositions . . .,133
C. JAMS, the AAA, and the Federal Rules
JAMS and the AAA, because of the diversity of commercial
disputes that their rules are meant to govern, simply cannot provide
for very specific discovery rules applicable to all commercial
arbitrations. Moreover, arbitration is meant to be a more flexible
process tailored to the individual case and the parties' preferences.
Nevertheless, the two rule regimes touch on the same fundamental
points in attempting to describe and constrain discovery during
arbitration. When they do so, they attempt to use-or, as the case
may be, specifically distinguish fronm-concepts familiar to the
Federal Rules: specifically, the concepts of party cooperation and the
consideration of proportionality, and the definition of relevance.
129. JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARB. R. 17 (2014), available at http://
www.j amsadr.com/rules-comprehensive-arbitration/.
130. AAA COMMERCIAL ARB. R. & MEDIATION P. R-22 (2013), available at
https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeld=/UCM/ADRSTG_004103.
131. AAA COMMERCIAL ARB. R. & MEDIATION P. R-33 (2013), available at
https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeld=/UCM/ADRSTG004103.
132. AAA COMMERCIAL ARB. R. & MEDIATION P. L-3(f) (2013), available
at https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeld=/UCM/ADRSTG_004103.
133. Id.
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Accordingly, before proceeding further, this subpart will compare
those concepts, in light of how the different regimes contrast with the
revisions to the Federal Rules.
1. Relevance
The current, non-revised Federal Rules permit broad
discovery, which can involve documents that are not directly
relevant to a claim or defense, but which have the potential to lead a
party to other documents that do contain such information. 134 The
2015 revisions limit this language by removing the "subject matter"
provision.1 35 However, given that this provision is rarely invoked,
this change is unlikely to lead to substantial changes. For JAMS, the
relevance language contained in the two optional expedited rules
appears similar to the revised definition of the 2015 Federal Rules.
The JAMS rules explicitly state that document requests shall be
limited to documents "directly relevant to the matters in dispute or to
its outcome," be "reasonably restricted" in terms of "subject matter,"
and "not include broad phraseology."'136 Whereas the changes to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 wholly eliminates mention of
discovery for items "relevant to the subject matter,''1 37 the JAMS
rule preserves mention of subject matter; but, the use of the words
"directly relevant" still indicates a fairly narrow conception of
relevance.
However, the two "Expedited" JAMS rules contained in Rule
16 are only binding when parties agree to them; if they are not
invoked, then parties will be operating under either the
"Comprehensive" or "Streamlined" rules. Those rules rely upon
"voluntary exchange" by parties cooperating in "good faith."',38
Both Rule 13 of the Streamlined Rules and Rule 17 of the
134. See discussion supra Part I(A) (discussing the "relevant to the subject
matter" and "reasonably calculated to lead to" provisions).
135. See discussion supra Part I(A) (discussing the revised Rule 26 where
the "reasonably calculated to lead to" admissible evidence provision is removed).
136. JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARB. R. 16.2 (2014), available at http://
www.j amsadr.com/rules-comprehensive-arbitration/.
137. See discussion supra Part I(A) (describing the revised text of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26).
138. JAMS STREAMLINED ARB. R. 13 (2013), available at http:/
/www.jamsadr.com/rules-streamlined-arbitration/; JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARB. R.
17 (2014), available at http://www.jamsadr.com/rules-comprehensive-arbitration/.
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Comprehensive Rules provide that parties should be prepared to
exchange all non-privileged documents and other information
"relevant to the dispute or claim."139
The AAA's discovery rule, R-22, does not use the word
"relevance" in Section (a) of the rule, and does not define
"relevance" when it uses the word in Section (b) of the rule. In
Section (a), R-22 frames the process of discovery in a way where the
"arbitrator shall manage" whatever exchange of information takes
place with a view towards economic efficiency, and equality of
treatment; it does not approach the concept of relevance from a
definitional perspective, but rather from that of the arbitrator's
discretion.140  Later in the R-22(b) when the word "relevance" is
actually used, it defines relevance in relation "to the outcome of
disputed issues. ' 141 By making initial discovery exchanges fully
within the control of the arbitrator but providing for subsequent
discovery of arguably "relevant" material not yet disclosed, the AAA
rules are perhaps able to prevent more significant, extended
discovery disputes later in the arbitration.
ii. Proportionality
The changes to proportionality contained in the 2014
revisions to the Federal Rules could arguably be considered a change
without meaningful impact because a proportionality analysis was
always intended by the framers of the Federal Rules-or it could be
viewed as the latest in a process seeking to actually make substantive
changes to the meaning of discovery.142  At present, while
139. JAMS STREAMLINED ARB. R. 13 available at http://www.jams
adr.com/rules-comprehensive-arbitration/; JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARB. R. 17.
140. See discussion supra Part II(B) (describing the text of the AAA rule).
141. See AAA COMMERCIAL ARB. R. & MEDIATION P. R-22 (2013),
available at https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeld=/UCM/ADRSTG
004103 (providing only that the arbitrator may require production of documents
which are "relevant and material to the outcome of disputed issues").
142. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel & David F. Herr, Applying Amended Rule
26(b)(1) in Litigation: The New Scope of Discovery, 199 F.R.D. 396, 404 (2001)
("The change in the language of Rule 26(b)(1) and its drafting history, including
the debate over efforts to drop the change, all clearly suggest hat the scope of
discovery under new Rule 26(b)(1) is designed to be narrower than under old Rule
26(b)(1)."); Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV.
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proportionality exists in Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii), as previously
discussed, there has been concern that it is not rigorously applied,
arguably based on where it is located in the text of Rule 26 itself.
143
However, the Advisory Committee has made it clear that it is not
seeking to bring about broad change--because proportionality has
always been a consideration--but, instead, explains that these
revisions merely seek to clarify how the proportionality provision is
supposed to apply, and potentially increase the rate at which judges
actually apply the provision.
144
Both of the arbitration regimes discussed above have
explicitly provided for some conception of proportionality within
their rules. JAMS's Comprehensive Rules do not use the word
"proportionality," but they use other words which clearly implicate
the concept; the word "disproportionate" is used in Rule 16.2(c)(iv),
which is one of the rules only applicable within the context of the
optional, "expedited" procedures, and is only applicable to
e-discovery.145 Reference to "burden" or "burdensomeness" is made
three times throughout the comprehensive rules: once in Rule
16.2(c)(iv); again in Rule 17(b) in the context of a party request for
depositions above and beyond the single deposition provided for;
and a third time in Rule 21, as a consideration for an arbitrator ruling
on an objection to producing a subpoenaed person as a witness, or to
other evidence. 
146
747, 747 (1998) ("[S]ince 1976, proposals for amendment to the rules have
generally involved retreats from the broadest concept of discovery . .."); Lee H.
Rosenthal, A Few Thoughts on Electronic Discovery After December 1, 2006, 116
YALE L.J. POCKET PART 167, 191 (2006) ("The frequency of changes to the
discovery rules-in 1983, 1991, 1993, 2000, and again in 2006-reflects an
ongoing struggle to find fair and reliable means to contain discovery and keep it
reasonably related to the needs of particular cases.").
143. See discussion supra Part I(A) (discussing Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26).
144. See discussion supra Part I(A) (discussing Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26).
145. See JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARB. R. 16.2 (2014), available at http://
www.jamsadr.com/rules-comprehensive-arbitration/ ("When the costs and burdens
of e-discovery are disproportionate to the nature of the dispute ... the Arbitrator
may... deny such requests.").
146. JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARB. R. 16.2(c)(iv), 17(b), 21 (2014), available
at http://www.jamsadr.com/rules-comprehensive-arbitration/ (noting that Rule
16.2(c)(iv) is concerned with when "the costs and burdens of e-discovery are
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To the degree that the financial burdens inflicted by
burdensome or disproportionate discovery are arguably part of the
question of proportionality in the eyes of the Federal Rules,47 JAMS
and AAA do not seem to address costs in the discovery context.
Under JAMS's rules, costs are mentioned in the context of e-
discovery, but afterwards only mentioned in non-discovery situations
such as Rule 22(k)(i), which provides that a party requesting a
stenographic record bears the cost unless there is some agreement o
share the cost among the parties.14 8 The only other usage of the
word "cost" in the discovery context is in Rule 24(g), which
authorizes an arbitrator to determine reasonable attorneys' fees in
part based on "the failure of a Party to cooperate reasonably in the
discovery process and/or comply with the [a]rbitrator's discovery
orders" when this "caused delay to the proceeding or additional costs
to the other [p]arties. 149
The AAA perhaps takes a slightly stronger stance on
including proportionality as an explicit requirement to be considered
in all discovery contexts, but when it does so, it adopts language
different than the term "proportionality." In R-22, the AAA
commands the arbitrator to "manage any necessary exchange of
information among the parties with a view to achieving an efficient
and economical resolution of the dispute."'150 This is similar to the
revisions to the 2015 rules in that the concept itself--regardless of
the words chosen to represent it--makes an appearance in the
disproportionate"; Rule 17 is concerned with "the burdensomeness of the request
on the opposing Parties and the witness"; and Rule 21 is concerned with weighing
"the burden on the producing Party and witness" with the proponent's need for the
evidence).
147. See discussion supra Part I(A) (discussing how after being revised to
strengthen proportionality, Rule 26(b)(1) mentions "burden or expense of the
proposed discovery" as one of the factors to be considered) (emphasis added) and
discussion supra Part I(A) (acknowledging, under Oppenheimer, that the default
rule is that costs will be paid by the party responsible for production).
148. JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARB. R. 22 (2014), available at http://
www.j amsadr.com/rules-comprehensive-arbitration/.
149. JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARB. R. 24 (2014), available at http://
www.j amsadr.com/rules-comprehensive-arbitration/.
150. AAA COMMERCIAL ARB. R. & MEDIATION P. R-22 (2013) (emphasis
added), available at https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/ADR
STG 004103.
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primary text of R-22, immediately following the name of the rule.' 51
Furthermore, in R-23, which lays out the enforcement powers of the
arbitrator, the AAA gives arbitrators the license to "[i]ssue any
orders necessary to enforce the provisions of rules R-21 and R-22
and to otherwise achieve a fair, efficient and economical resolution
of the case, including, without limitation: ... (c) allocating costs of
producing documentation, including electronically stored
documentation."' 
52
iii. Objections to Discovery
The 2015 revisions to the Federal Rules make clear that
objections to requested production must clarify what documents are
being withheld and state the reasons for withholding such
documents.'53  JAMS and the AAA lack any such standard for
objections.
iv. Cooperation
As noted above, the changes to Rule 1 of the Federal Rules
are meant to create a duty of cooperation, but this does not appear to
be a strong mandate. However, it may have the effect of
strengthening other mandates for judges to enforce cooperative
practices by parties, such as those found in Rule 37 and Rule 26 (f)-
(g).154  JAMS's rules rely upon "voluntary exchange" by parties
cooperating in "good faith."'155 In contrast, AAA's rules are framed
from the arbitrator's perspective;156 starting with an emphasis on
what the arbitrator may or may not permit, arguably suggesting a
more arbitrator-centered mode of control which is akin to some of
151. See AAA COMMERCIAL ARB. R. & MEDIATION P. R-22 (2013)
(discussing the balancing required of an arbitrator).
152. AAA COMMERCIAL ARB. R. & MEDIATION P. R-23(c) (2013) (emphasis
added), available at https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeld=/UCM/ADR
STG 004103.
153. See discussion supra Part I(A) (discussing the specificity requirement).
154. See discussion supra Part I(B) (discussing the duty of cooperation).
155. See JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARB. R. 17 (2014), available at http://
www.jamsadr.com/rules-comprehensive-arbitration/ ("The Parties shall cooperate
in good faith in the voluntary and informal exchange of... information.").
156. See supra Part II(C)(1) (construing R-22).
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the efforts under the Federal Rules to increase managerial judging.157
Such a reading of the AAA rules is, however, consistent with AAA's
advocacy of what it refers to as "muscular arbitration," which aims
to make arbitration discovery less costly and more efficient by
empowering arbitrators to forcefully take charge of proceedings
through use of discretion.'58
III. RECENT EFFORTS TO MAKE DISCOVERY IN ARBITRATION LESS
COSTLY
Arbitration is largely susceptible to the parties' deliberate
choices. Parties sometimes insist upon broad discovery, and
arbitrators sometimes believe they are obligated to permit practices
that are detrimental to an efficient, cost-effective resolution of the
dispute because of the apparent will of the parties. Also, many
arbitrators simply believe that it is not their place to take a strong,
"managerial" approach to their duties, absent the parties' explicit
consent.159  Over the past ten to fifteen years, commercial
arbitrations have arguably become increasingly similar to litigation
because of these factors. This Part will first seek to describe this
trend. It will then examine some of the ways in which various
institutions have attempted to address it. Finally, it will suggest that
the revisions to the Federal Rules, if taken to heart by the legal
157. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing the Duke
Conference's determination that there was a need for "early and active judicial
case management").
158. See infra Part III(B) (discussing "muscular arbitration" as one of the
ways to lower the cost of arbitration by reversing the litigation trend in arbitration
discovery).
159. See DISPUTE RESOLUTION SECTION, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N,
GUIDELINES FOR THE ARBITRATOR'S CONDUCT OF THE PRE-HEARING PHASE OF
DOMESTIC COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS AND GUIDELINES FOR THE ARBITRATOR'S
CONDUCT OF THE PRE-HEARING PHASE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS 11
(2010), available at http://old.nysba.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Publications/
GuidelinesforArbitration/DR guidelines bookletproof_ 0-24-11 .pdf ("Section
10 of the Federal Arbitration Act provides that one of the very few ways an
arbitration award can be vacated is 'where the arbitrators were guilty of
misconduct in refusing . . . to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy.' Some arbitrators tend to grant extensive discovery out of concern
that any other approach might lead to a vacated award under Section 10.").
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community, may inevitably have an effect upon arbitration and be
marginally helpful towards reversing this trend.
A. Evidence of the Litigation Trend in Arbitration
Recently, arbitrations have become more like litigation,
particularly in the realm of discovery. The arbitration discovery
process has become lengthier and more costly. In a recent article,
Thomas Stipanowich and Ryan Lamar describe two separate surveys
of corporate counsel; the first was circulated in 1997 and the second
in 2011.160 The original 1997 survey was taken during the "Quiet
Revolution," a term used to describe the transformation of American
conflict resolution during the latter decades of the twentieth century,
a period that also saw the "Vanishing Trial" partially due to the rise
of ADR and the costs of litigation.16 1 The 1997 survey suggested
that at that particular point in time, "almost seventy percent [of
respondents] indicated they chose arbitration because it saved time
(68.5%) or saved money (68.6%). "162 A majority indicated that
arbitration "afforded a more satisfactory process than litigation and
limited the extent of discovery."'
' 63
Perhaps ominously, the 1997 respondents "expressed views
that arbitration might be improved by introducing elements
analogous to litigation," despite the fact that the "Quiet Revolution"
was "[s]purred by the need to develop alternatives to the high costs
and risks associated with litigation"164-in particular, from
discovery. By the time of the 2011 survey however, a somewhat
different picture of the respondents' perceptions of arbitration had
emerged. This perception appeared to have reversed that particular
position on litigation-style discovery: In the 1997 survey, 59.3% of
respondents stated that "limited discovery" was a compelling reason
to use arbitration over litigation; by 2011, that percentage had
dropped to 51.5%.165 Although still more than half, the downward
160. STIPANOWICH & LAMARE, supra note 2, at 4-5.
161. See id. at 9-10 (discussing the "unprecedented changes" to conflict
resolution procedures happening at the time of the "Quiet Revolution").
162. Id. at 16-17.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 8-9.
165. Id. at 37.
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shift is an indication of the degree to which discovery practices
changed over the fifteen years between the two surveys.
At the time of the 1997 survey, many corporate attorneys
were either less experienced or wholly inexperienced with the
arbitration process.' Whereas by 2011 "during the course of
repeatedly using and participating in ADR processes, attorneys ha[d]
actually changed those processes. In some cases the transformation
ha[d] made alternatives to litigation more like the very thing they
were designed to replace--more formal, more adversarial, lengthier
and more expensive."'67 Across the board, more companies "viewed
cost as a barrier to the use of arbitration."' 68 Although from the mid-
1980s to 1997, arbitration seemed to ride a rising tide of widespread
usage, the 2011 survey reported that "half of the survey respondents
[thought] it unlikely that their company [would] use arbitration in the
future."1
69
While these surveys are very useful, it is unclear to what
extent they indicate that in-house counsel have significantly
decreased their use of arbitration. Although the 2011 survey
indicated that since 1997 leading businesses had decreased the use of
binding arbitration across several different types of disputes, the
number of commercial arbitrations administered by the AAA has not
changed significantly.170  Since 2003, the AAA's commercial
arbitration caseload has fluctuated between a high of 13,600 (2003)
and a low of 11,355 (2007). Most recently, the caseload number was
12,680 in 2012.171
166. This factor-counsel's better familiarity with litigation and litigation
style discovery-potentially explains, at least in part, the expressed desire in 1997
to see the introduction into arbitration of some elements analogous to litigation
discovery.
167. STIPANOWICH & LAMARE, supra note 2, at 40.
168. Id. at 54.
169. Compare id. at 63 (discussing survey results), with DAVID LIPSKY &
RONALD SEEBER, THE APPROPRIATE RESOLUTION OF CORPORATE DISPUTES: A
REPORT ON THE GROWING USE OF ADR BY U.S. CORPORATIONS 29 (1998),
available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.comell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1003
&context=icrpubs ("More than 29 percent said they were unlikely or very unlikely
to use arbitration in the future. .. ").
170. STIPANOWICH & LAMARE, supra note 2, at 19-22.
171. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Reflections on the State and Future of
Commercial Arbitration: Challenges, Opportunities, Proposals 6 (Pepperdine
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B. Attempts to Reverse the Litigation Trend in
Arbitration Discovery
Although arbitration has experienced a trend towards
litigation, in the past five years there has been a push back against
that trajectory. However, because arbitration is inherently a party
driven process, it is difficult to curtail undesirable litigation-style
discovery practices through changes in the arbitration rule regimes
themselves. Parties must choose to arbitrate under JAMS or the
AAA rules for their respective rules to apply, but those parties can at
the same time contractually modify how those rules will actually be
implemented; as such, if a party wishes to provide for the AAA
rules, but with discovery "consistent with the Federal Rules" in the
governing contract, no arbitrator would be able to ignore such a
command. If JAMS or the AAA were to adopt an inflexible
discovery regime and prohibit parties from attempting to modify
discovery rules, it would undermine the inherent principle of
arbitration and drive potential users away. Because their rules must
apply to a very broad array of disputes, arbitration providers like
JAMS and the AAA cannot severely or unilaterally attempt to
restrict discovery through the mechanism of their rules.
At present, one set of solutions focuses upon the arbitrators
themselves. Although arbitrators cannot blatantly ignore explicit
provisions that parties add into an arbitration provision, by training
and reminding them that discovery in arbitration is meant to be more
limited than discovery in litigation, it is perhaps possible to prevent
arbitrators from innocently or negligently allowing parties to employ
litigation-style discovery.
Both JAMS and the College of Commercial Arbitrators
(CCA)-a collective of experienced professional arbitrators--have
produced protocols for arbitrators and parties alike.172  These
protocols cannot change the realities of the contractual nature of
arbitration, but they do explain to arbitrators the nature of the
problem, which, perhaps, has arisen in part through the lack of
arbitrator awareness of their own contributions to allowing broader
and more costly discovery.
University Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2014/29), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=-2519084.
172. Stipanowich, supra note 171, at 15, 30.
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The JAMS "Recommended Arbitration Discovery Protocols
for Domestic, Commercial Cases," which was released in 2010,
emphasizes that "good judgment of the arbitrator" is a "key element"
in preserving the cost-efficient, expedited nature of arbitration, and
explains that, particularly with respect to discovery matters,
arbitrator discretion must be exercised in a manner consistent with
limiting discovery when possible.173 The JAMS Protocols identify
the fact that "party preferences" can lead to overly broad arbitration
discovery and indicate to the arbitrator that, when not explicitly
bound by the contract, the arbitrator's proper role is to resist parties'
attempts to subvert the aims and goals of arbitration. The JAMS
Protocols also stress "Early Attention to Discovery by the
Arbitrator," 174 advise arbitrators to "establish[] the ground rules,"
and remind the arbitrators that the JAMS Comprehensive rules "lack
the specificity that one finds, for example, in the Federal Rules."',
75
The JAMS protocols also discuss depositions and stress that while
parties are entitled to one deposition, if an arbitrator chooses to grant
leave for more discovery, the arbitrator must weigh this decision
carefully because it can make the arbitration "extremely expensive,
wasteful and time-consuming."
176
The 2010 CCA Protocols also attempt to raise arbitrator
awareness of some of the specific ways in which parties have
brought litigation-style practices into arbitration. The CCA
Protocols explain:
[m]any skilled and experienced attorneys, while
happy to accept the foregoing advantages of
arbitration, nonetheless generally want to try cases in
arbitration with the same intensity and the same
tactics with which they were conducted in court.
Thus, expanded arbitral motion practice and
discovery have developed within the framework of
173. JAMS, JAMS RECOMMENDED ARBITRATION DISCOVERY PROTOCOLS
FOR DOMESTIC, COMMERCIAL CASES 2-3 (2010), available at http://www.jams
adr.com/arbitration-discovery-protocols/.
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standard commercial arbitration rules which tend to
afford arbitrators and parties considerable 'wiggle
room' on matters of procedure. As a consequence,
practice under modem arbitration procedures is today
often a close, albeit private, analogue to civil trial.
177
The Protocols go on to explain that despite these practices,
arbitrators are supposed to be "deliberate and proactive" in resolving
disputes, and must maintain a focus on controlling discovery and
motion practice where possible.
178
For the AAA, members of the organization's leadership have
been lending their voices to the debate by specifically emphasizing
"muscular arbitration." A 2013 article from the Dispute Resolution
Journal, written in part by Robert Matlin, a senior vice president of
the AAA, states that "[t]he challenge of protecting the time and cost
advantages of arbitration will continue until parties and arbitration
counsel learn to think of arbitration as a process that is distinct from
litigation and arbitrators learn to be more 'muscular' and disciplined
managers of the process and themselves.'79 Calling upon arbitrators
to embrace being "muscular" and to take a more forceful, aggressive
approach to managing arbitrations from the beginning will deter
parties from engaging in discovery practices which are antithetical to
arbitration's intended purpose.
The recent emphasis by JAMS, the AAA, and CCA on how
arbitrators and parties ought to conduct discovery is likely to have a
positive effect towards making discovery more cost efficient and
faster, but it is perhaps too early to see results. In order to maintain a
competitive advantage over federal court litigation, arbitration must
remain, in the aggregate, a less costly and quicker method of
resolving disputes-although, as mentioned above, there are
numerous other reasons parties choose arbitration to settle domestic
commercial disputes that have nothing to do with costs.
177. COLL. OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATORS, PROTOCOLS FOR EXPEDITIOUS,
COST-EFFECTIVE COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: KEY ACTION STEPS FOR BUSINESS
USERS, COUNSEL, ARBITRATORS & ARBITRATION PROVIDER INSTITUTIONS 5
(Thomas J. Stipanowich, et al, eds., 2010).
178. Id. at 22.
179. Mitchel Marinello & Robert Matlin, Muscular Arbitration and
Arbitrators Self-Management Can Make Arbitration Faster and More Economical,
67 DISP. RES. J., no. 4, 2013, at 69.
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Both arbitration organizations and the Advisory Committee
are aware that the relative costs of arbitration (as compared to
litigation) affect parties' determination of which fora to bring
disputes. Arbitrators "must strike a delicate balance .. working to
ensure that the discovery will allow the case to be resolved more
quickly and less expensively than it would be in litigation"'
180
because, unless arbitration is "significantly faster and more cost
effective than litigation[,] . . . arbitration will lose much of its
value.081 As noted above, JAMS and the AAA have taken steps to
ensure that arbitration continues to have a competitive advantage
over litigation. It is equally clear that the Advisory Committee, in
proposing revisions to the Federal Rules, seeks to make changes in
part to ensure that litigation becomes less costly lest litigants choose
arbitration. The Advisory Committee acknowledged that the relative
costs are important to litigants in its June 14, 2014 Memorandum to
the Standing Committee on the Rules of Practice and Procedure.,
8 2
In discussing the public comments in favor of the proposed
proportionality changes, the Memorandum explained that these
comments "stated that disproportionate litigation costs bar many
from access to federal courts and have resulted in a flight to other
dispute resolution fora such as arbitration."'
' 83
The revisions to the Federal Rules will perhaps only have a
marginal effect on how arbitrations are conducted. As explained
above, the revisions may not bring about a significant change to the
way discovery is conducted in federal courts, or the revisions may
too vaguely state their philosophy of cooperation between
adversaries, or they may fail to resonate within the hearts and minds
of lawyers schooled to think as adversaries, not problem-solvers.
However, in the recently released 2015 Year-End Report on the
Federal Judiciary, those hoping for a meaningful change in the wake
180. John Wilkinson, Arbitration Discovery: Getting it Right, 21 DisP. RES.
MAG., no. 1, 2014 at 4 (emphasis added).
181. See id. at 1 (discussing the issues with incorporating elements of
litigation in arbitration).
182. SEPT. 2014 RULES REPORT, supra note 7, at app. B-5.
183. SEPT. 2014 RULES REPORT, supra note 7, at app. B-5.
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of the rule revisions gained a potentially-influential and high profile
supporter: Chief Justice John Roberts.' 
84
The Chief Justice dedicated much of the December 31st
memo to describing his earnest desire for the legal community to
heed the cooperative message embodied in the rule revisions.
Acknowledging that while over the past 80 years, most amendments
of the Federal rules have been "modest and technical, even
persnickety," Roberts states that "the 2015 amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are different."'185 Roberts recites
the history of the 2010 Duke Conference, notes the resulting findings
of a need for cooperation, proportionality, judicial case management,
as well as the burgeoning problem of electronically stored
information, before giving his own personal analysis of the 2015
revisions:
The amended rules, which . . . went into effect one
month ago . . . mark significant change, for both
lawyers and judges, in the future conduct of civil
trials.
The amendments may not look like a big deal
at first glance, but they are. That is one reason I have
chosen to highlight them in this report.'
86
Roberts speaks favorably of how "by a mere eight words,"
the modified Rule 1 "make express the obligation of judges and
lawyers to work cooperatively in controlling the expense and time
demands of litigation.' 87 Roberts characterizes the new Rule 26 as
"crystaliz[ing] the concept of reasonable limits on discovery through
increased reliance on the common-sense concept of
proportionality[,]" one which relies upon a "careful and realistic
assessment of actual need.'' 88 Roberts affirmatively acknowledges
that this assessment "may, as a practical matter, require the active
involvement of a neutral arbiter-the federal judge-to guide
184. See generally, John Roberts, 2015 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2015) [hereinafter 2015 CHIEF JUSTICE REPORT], available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2015year-endreport.pdf.
185. 2015 CHIEF JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 184, at 4.
186. 2015 CHIEF JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 184, at 5.
187. 2015 CHIEF JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 184, at 6.
188. 2015 CHIEF JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 184, at 6-7.
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decisions respecting the scope of discovery[,]" which is aided by the
fact that the amended rules "accordingly emphasize the crucial role
of federal judges in engaging in early and effective case
management."
89
Roberts acknowledges, however, that the revisions to the
rules are not guaranteed. Successfully achieving the goal of Rule 1
will occur "only if the entire legal community, including the bench,
bar, and legal academy, step up to the challenge of making real
change."190 Roberts concludes with further remarks affirming the
need for "genuine commitment, by judges and lawyers alike, to
ensure that our legal culture reflects the values we all ultimately
share," before later charging the legal community to share in the
need to "engineer a change in our legal culture."
'191
Thus, despite the passionate advocacy from an individual
possessing a powerful pulpit to spread a message to the legal
community, the effect of the revised federal rules remains murky at
best. If the legal community is able to follow in the words of the
Chief Justice and pull collectively to bring about real change on a
meaningful and wide-spread level, it seems that such a philosophy
would almost inevitably spill over into the realm of arbitration.
However, if the effect of the rule revisions is relatively minor, then
any spill-over effect on how arbitrations are conducted will be
correspondingly minimal.
CONCLUSION
Arbitration is a flexible means of resolving disputes quickly
and efficiently, and if used properly, it has the capacity to provide
exceptional value to financial, commercial, and business users.
However, engaging in certain litigation-style discovery practices
may cause any given arbitration to spiral out of control in terms of
189. 2015 CHIEF JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 184, at 7. The Chief Judge
coyly applauds the use of informal conferences between parties and judges before
the filing of formal motions as settings which can "obviate the need for a formal
motion-a well times scowl from a trial judge can go a long way in moving things
along crisply." 2015 CHIEF JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 184, at 7.
190. 2015 CHIEF JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 184, at 9.
191. 2015 CHIEF JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 184, at 10, 11.
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cost and time. In these situations, the resulting process is one no less
protracted or expensive than civil litigation-yet one which lacks the
procedural safeguards and appellate options which arguably justify
the higher costs and extended timeframes of civil litigation.
Parties themselves may be unwilling to sacrifice meaningful
control over discovery, either in a pre-dispute contract providing for
arbitration or a post-dispute agreement to arbitrate. The former
makes it difficult to predict the discovery needs of a future dispute,
and the latter goes against the grain of most litigation-familiar
attorneys by sacrificing tactical options. Moreover, the rules
promulgated by various arbitration service providers like JAMS and
AAA-even those rules which are "Streamlined," "Expedited," or
"Accelerated"--are limited because they must maintain the
flexibility to apply to myriad different types of disputes with varying
discovery needs. Providers cannot risk driving parties away by
adopting rigid rules.
Thus, the arbitration community has focused on solutions in
the past several years that include providing better information to
arbitrators on the true nature of their role, the ways in which
arbitrators' discretion should be utilized, and various methods of
either coping with party misbehavior or forestalling abusive
discovery practice by adopting a more aggressive, managerial stance
in order to take control of and enforce the arbitration schedule.
While the 2015 revisions to the Federal Rules potentially will not
only limit discovery in traditional civil litigation, but also carry over
into arbitration and help to limit discovery in arbitral proceedings as
well, due to the relatively minor changes to the Federal Rules, it
seems unlikely that arbitrators and organizations which administer
arbitrations will feel the need to reduce discovery costs even further,
unless it comes in the wake of the larger legal community engaging
in the difficult task of reigning in civil discovery and cooperating
with one another to bring about real change.
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